Introduction

The ascendancy of interest groups and the decline of political parties have been defining features of U.S. politics for much of the past one hundred years. The demise of the patronage system, together with the institution of direct primaries and the Australian ballot near the turn of the century, coincided with rapid growth in the number and variety of interest groups active before Congress and federal agencies. These changes, occurring within a constitutional system of autonomous national institutions and geographic representation, made it exceptionally difficult for legislative parties to mediate access of organized interests and to act cohesively . As evidenced by the revolt against Speaker Cannon in 1910, centralized partisan control of the U.S. House of Representatives was difficult to sustain in the presence of a weakened party system. Important developments during the past several decades, however, suggest that the relative strengths of the congressional parties and national interests may be changing. By most accounts, congressional parties have become stronger and more cohesive in recent years JOHN R. WRIGHT The Ohio State University
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The remainder of the paper follows in three main sections. First, I review the public policy explanation for congressional reform and the strengthening of the congressional parties. Second, I pose the (e.g., . Indices of party voting began to increase in the early 1980s, the Democratic whip system was expanded, and the incidence of omnibus bills and complex rules grew noticeably as party leaders in the House sought to control outcomes on the floor. Congressional party leaders are now believed to care about their parties' policy records in much the same way that party leaders in parliamentary regimes care about policy (e.g., .
One supposed implication of stronger parties is weaker interest groups. Schattschneider (1942, 196) noted that "If the parties exercised the power to govern effectively, they would shut out the pressure groups." More recently, Jewell and Patterson (1986, 191 ) have concluded that "There is, indeed, an inverse relation between political party and interest group strength; where parties are strong, groups tend to be weak, and where parties are weak, groups tend to be strong." These generalizations imply that resurrection in the strength and cohesiveness of the congressional parties should accompany a decline in the influence of interest groups in Congress. Indeed, has argued that the contemporary policymaking process is "not dominated so often by a relatively small number of powerful interest groups as it may once have been" (204). He observes that "many of the old symbioses have given way, destabilized as a result of expanded group participation, of greater electoral security, increased staff, and lessened inclination or need to specialize on the part of Congress" (229).
My purpose in this paper is to assess changes in the organization of Congress and the congressional parties over the past 30 years that have affected the relationship between organized interests and parties. I begin by reexamining the causes for organizational reforms in Congress during the 1970s. These congressional reforms are usually explained as consequences of liberal policy demands made by congressional Democrats, with the implication that the central objective of legislative parties is to make policy to satisfy these demands. I argue instead that the reforms and subsequent policy agenda of congressional Democrats were driven by legislators' concerns about money and reelection. I argue that the political parties have not formed alliances with distinct and opposing sets of interests, as would be expected under party government. Instead, the increasing pressures of fundraising and reelection have forced both Democrats and Republicans to compete for, and to share, a common constituency-organized business.
The remainder of the paper follows in three main sections. First, I review the public policy explanation for congressional reform and the strengthening of the congressional parties. Second, I pose the
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argument that the reforms were driven by money and reelection, not policy. And third, I assess parties and interest groups in the postreform House. I conclude with some general observations about interest groups and legislative parties.
Public Policy and Reform
As interest groups were proliferating and establishing operations in Washington beginning in the mid-1960s, significant organizational and procedural reforms were also underway in Congress.' By the mid1970s, the selection of committee chairs was made subject to caucus approval; subcommittees were established for most committees and then provided with staff, funding, fixed jurisdictions, and referral of appropriate legislation; the Ways and Means Committee was expanded and Democratic members stripped of their authority to make committee assignments; bills could be referred to multiple committees; committee hearings and markups were opened to the public; teller votes were introduced; and the Speaker was allowed to nominate Democratic members of the Rules Committee. Generally, then, power over legislation was dispersed more widely within the House, the powers of the Speaker were enhanced, and the entire legislative process became more accessible to the public.
What caused these changes? The prevailing explanation is public policy demands from liberal Democrats. Rohde (1991, 20) , for example, traces the origins of the reform movement to the liberal Democratic Study Group. He contends that "policy goals were a primary motive among DSG leaders who proposed, packaged, and mustered support for most reforms, and that these policy goals were an important common ground among rank-and-file members who supported the reforms, in addition to (or sometimes in spite of) other motivations." Likewise, Sinclair (1995, 34) asserts that "Northern liberals' policy dissatisfaction provided the initial impetus for and a continuous driving force behind the reform movement." Deering and Smith (1997, 33) agree, noting that demands for reform were "especially strong" among junior members and liberal Democrats "who found their efforts to shape public policy stymied by their more conservative senior colleagues." Rieselbach (1986, 44) argues that issues such as environmental protection, school prayer, abortion, civil rights, and energy "rose to the top of the policy agenda, and Congress found that it was ill-prepared to deal with them. Congress, suffering from a collective, institutional 'inferiority complex,' called for reform." Similarly, Davidson (1992, 11) suggests that an underlying cause of argument that the reforms were driven by money and reelection, not policy. And third, I assess parties and interest groups in the postreform House. I conclude with some general observations about interest groups and legislative parties.
What caused these changes? The prevailing explanation is public policy demands from liberal Democrats. Rohde (1991, 20) , for example, traces the origins of the reform movement to the liberal Democratic Study Group. He contends that "policy goals were a primary motive among DSG leaders who proposed, packaged, and mustered support for most reforms, and that these policy goals were an important common ground among rank-and-file members who supported the reforms, in addition to (or sometimes in spite of) other motivations." Likewise, Sinclair (1995, 34) asserts that "Northern liberals' policy dissatisfaction provided the initial impetus for and a continuous driving force behind the reform movement." Deering and Smith (1997, 33) agree, noting that demands for reform were "especially strong" among junior members and liberal Democrats "who found their efforts to shape public policy stymied by their more conservative senior colleagues." Rieselbach (1986, 44) argues that issues such as environmental protection, school prayer, abortion, civil rights, and energy "rose to the top of the policy agenda, and Congress found that it was ill-prepared to deal with them. Congress, suffering from a collective, institutional 'inferiority complex,' called for reform." Similarly, Davidson (1992, 11) suggests that an underlying cause of the reforms was a "series of unmet policy demands pushed by urban and suburban voting blocs, as well as minority groups."
Whatever their motivation, one important consequence of the reforms was the redistribution of power from southern conservatives to northern liberals. Orstein (1975, 89), for example, claims that "structural reform in Congress is generally a product of those who feel shortchanged of power" and notes that the reason "major reform efforts of the 1960s and 1970s have emanated from the liberal Democrats is simply that they were most in need of payoffs." Davidson and Oleszek (1977, 43) argue that the reforms "were mainly efforts to give more legislators a 'piece of the action,"' but the authors imply that it was action over policy that was of most concern. Cox and McCubbins (1993, 271) see the reforms as "redressing the balance between veto and proposal power in favor of the latter by increasing the number of subunits with proposal power." The reforms, in other words, enhanced the policymaking authority of northern liberals at the expense of southern conservatives.
One intended consequence of the reforms, according to Rohde, was a stronger party and leadership apparatus capable of carrying out the policy mandates of the reformers (Rohde 1991, 28-29).
... a wide range of reforms in the House were linked together by a common goal, and by a common theme or approach. The goal was to improve the chances for enacting into law policies favored by a majority of Democrats. The approach was to make people who held power through the party-leaders, committee and subcommittee chairs-responsible to the majority of that party, and to facilitate moving party-supported measures through the legislative process. All three tracks of these reforms were proposed by the same set of people-the DSG leadership-and they made no secret of the policy motivations behind their actions.
A more subtle, and less directly causal, explanation for stronger congressional parties pursuant to the reforms is offered by , who asserts that stronger party leadership evolved partly as an unintended consequence of the reforms. Soon after the initial wave of reform, amendment activity on the House floor increased significantly, which increased the uncertainty and vulnerability of committees' legislative initiatives ). As a result, "Democratic committee contingents, Democratic committee leaders, and Democratic members needed help passing their legislation, and began to look to the party leadership for that help" (Sinclair 1995, 48) . The response of party leaders was to become "more and more drawn into the substantive legislative process; in the House, leaders developed special rules into powerful and flexible tools for strengthening floor decisions" (Sinclair 1997, 231) . the reforms was a "series of unmet policy demands pushed by urban and suburban voting blocs, as well as minority groups."
A more subtle, and less directly causal, explanation for stronger congressional parties pursuant to the reforms is offered by , who asserts that stronger party leadership evolved partly as an unintended consequence of the reforms. Soon after the initial wave of reform, amendment activity on the House floor increased significantly, which increased the uncertainty and vulnerability of committees' legislative initiatives ). As a result, "Democratic committee contingents, Democratic committee leaders, and Democratic members needed help passing their legislation, and began to look to the party leadership for that help" (Sinclair 1995, 48) . The response of party leaders was to become "more and more drawn into the substantive legislative process; in the House, leaders developed special rules into powerful and flexible tools for strengthening floor decisions" (Sinclair 1997, 231 The policy explanation for the congressional reforms, therefore, represents a striking exception to the usual reelection perspective on parties and politicians. Not only are the parties typically thought of as election machines rather than policy advocates, but elected politicians are also typically thought to be motivated by reelection rather than policy . Hence, as an alternative to the policy explanation for reform, I explore below the possibility that congressional reform was consistent with electoral ambitions. Specifically, I propose that congressional Democrats undertook reform as a way to accommodate and appeal to organized interests whose financial resources were essential to the maintenance of their majority status.
Money and Reform
Perhaps even more significant to American politics during the 1970s than the congressional reforms were changes in the costs and methods of financing congressional campaigns. House and Senate campaigns have become increasingly costly over the years, and the pressure on members to raise money has increased accordingly. The rules of the game have also changed. The Federal Election Campaign Whether one subscribes to the direct causal link articulated by Rohde or the indirect connection advanced by Sinclair, the essential motivation for both the reform movement and the subsequent strengthening of the congressional party system was members' concerns for substantive policy. In short, liberal members of Congress, together with the Democratic leadership, seized direct responsibility for salient and, in many instances, controversial policy issues of the day. They did so, first, by significantly restructuring the committee and seniority system of the U.S. House and, second, by according party leaders greater power and responsibility for managing legislation.
The policy explanation for reform implies that a principal function of legislative parties is to formulate agendas and forge coalitions in order to satisfy preferences of the median party member. This perspective, however, is alien to the traditional view of legislative parties in presidential systems (e.g., Soraufand Wilson 1990). Epstein (1982, 280) The policy explanation for the congressional reforms, therefore, represents a striking exception to the usual reelection perspective on parties and politicians. Not only are the parties typically thought of as election machines rather than policy advocates, but elected politicians are also typically thought to be motivated by reelection rather than policy . Hence, as an alternative to the policy explanation for reform, I explore below the possibility that congressional reform was consistent with electoral ambitions. Specifically, I propose that congressional Democrats undertook reform as a way to accommodate and appeal to organized interests whose financial resources were essential to the maintenance of their majority status.
Perhaps even more significant to American politics during the 1970s than the congressional reforms were changes in the costs and methods of financing congressional campaigns. House and Senate campaigns have become increasingly costly over the years, and the pressure on members to raise money has increased accordingly. By the end of 1968, then, three important trends in campaign finance were obvious to congressional incumbents. First, the cost of campaigning had soared; second, the most promising new sources of money were from direct-mail solicitations to individuals and from nonlabor PACs; and third, nonlabor PACs were contributing to incumbents on the basis of their committee assignments. Importantly, two of these three trends clearly favored the Republicans. Republicans held a distinct advantage in direct-mail solicitations, and they were the favored recipients of nonlabor PAC money. Hence, their national party committees were raising five times more than the Democratic committees were.
If these developments were not concern enough for Democrats, The transformation of the campaign finance system was well under way by the time the Hansen Committee first met on May 12, 1970, to discuss reforms in congressional organization. Given the financial pressures on congressional campaigns by 1970, together with the increasing vulnerability of northern Democrats, Democratic reformers were surely quite sensitive to possible connections between campaign finance, congressional organization, and their future reelection prospects (e.g., Bender 1988). For Democrats, whose directmail operations were largely undeveloped, the most promising source of campaign funds was the burgeoning nonlabor PACs. As noted earlier, by 1970 these PACs had established clear patterns of contributing on the basis of committee jurisdiction. To tap into this new source of money, Democrats needed only to expand their presence and participation on key committees of interest to nonlabor PACs. At the time, these committees were dominated by southern Democrats from safe districts who needed money least, and thus, it was necessary to reform the committee system so as to distribute influence and participation more broadly within the party ranks. Doing so would ensure that PAC money began to flow to the most vulnerable party members, which would in turn ensure the continuation of Democratic congressional majorities.
1969-78: Democrats Cash In on Reform
In 1969, faced with soaring campaign costs, Congress began considering legislation to reform the process. Incumbents of both parties, but particularly Democrats (Sorauf 1988, 35) , worried that wealthy or well-funded challengers might unseat them in expensive media campaigns. Eventually, after vetoing campaign finance legislation in 1970, President Nixon in 1971 signed into law the Federal Election Campaign Act, the principal purpose of which was to limit expenditures on media advertising. The law limited the amount that congressional and presidential candidates could spend on media advertising to 10 cents per voter.
The legacy of the 1971 FECA, however, was not a limit on media expenditures (that limit was repealed by the 1974 amendments to the FECA) but instead on the proliferation ofPACs. The famous "separate, The transformation of the campaign finance system was well under way by the time the Hansen Committee first met on May 12, 1970, to discuss reforms in congressional organization. Given the financial pressures on congressional campaigns by 1970, together with the increasing vulnerability of northern Democrats, Democratic reformers were surely quite sensitive to possible connections between campaign finance, congressional organization, and their future reelection prospects (e.g., Bender 1988). For Democrats, whose directmail operations were largely undeveloped, the most promising source of campaign funds was the burgeoning nonlabor PACs. As noted earlier, by 1970 these PACs had established clear patterns of contributing on the basis of committee jurisdiction. To tap into this new source of money, Democrats needed only to expand their presence and participation on key committees of interest to nonlabor PACs. At the time, these committees were dominated by southern Democrats from safe districts who needed money least, and thus, it was necessary to reform the committee system so as to distribute influence and participation more broadly within the party ranks. Doing so would ensure that PAC money began to flow to the most vulnerable party members, which would in turn ensure the continuation of Democratic congressional majorities.
The legacy of the 1971 FECA, however, was not a limit on media expenditures (that limit was repealed by the 1974 amendments to the FECA) but instead on the proliferation ofPACs. The famous "separate, The transformation of the campaign finance system was well under way by the time the Hansen Committee first met on May 12, 1970, to discuss reforms in congressional organization. Given the financial pressures on congressional campaigns by 1970, together with the increasing vulnerability of northern Democrats, Democratic reformers were surely quite sensitive to possible connections between campaign finance, congressional organization, and their future reelection prospects (e.g., Bender 1988). For Democrats, whose directmail operations were largely undeveloped, the most promising source of campaign funds was the burgeoning nonlabor PACs. As noted earlier, by 1970 these PACs had established clear patterns of contributing on the basis of committee jurisdiction. To tap into this new source of money, Democrats needed only to expand their presence and participation on key committees of interest to nonlabor PACs. At the time, these committees were dominated by southern Democrats from safe districts who needed money least, and thus, it was necessary to reform the committee system so as to distribute influence and participation more broadly within the party ranks. Doing so would ensure that PAC money began to flow to the most vulnerable party members, which would in turn ensure the continuation of Democratic congressional majorities. Are the trends in campaign finance and congressional reforms coincidental? Perhaps. The parallels, however, are striking. Consider, for example, which House committees were most affected by the reforms. One would expect the congressional reforms-if driven by financial considerations-to have significant impact on those committees with jurisdiction over issues of interest to business and industry. In summary, not only did northern Democrats have ample incentive to reform the committee system for purely electoral reasons, but they also realized significant electoral dividends from their efforts. The policy explanation for congressional reform, in contrast, asserts that policy dissatisfaction among liberal Democrats, unable to implement their policy agenda because of a committee system dominated by southern conservatives, provided the incentive for reform. Sinclair (1995, 29) In summary, not only did northern Democrats have ample incentive to reform the committee system for purely electoral reasons, but they also realized significant electoral dividends from their efforts. The policy explanation for congressional reform, in contrast, asserts that policy dissatisfaction among liberal Democrats, unable to implement their policy agenda because of a committee system dominated by southern conservatives, provided the incentive for reform. Sinclair (1995, 29) In summary, not only did northern Democrats have ample incentive to reform the committee system for purely electoral reasons, but they also realized significant electoral dividends from their efforts. The policy explanation for congressional reform, in contrast, asserts that policy dissatisfaction among liberal Democrats, unable to implement their policy agenda because of a committee system dominated by southern conservatives, provided the incentive for reform. Sinclair (1995, 29) In summary, not only did northern Democrats have ample incentive to reform the committee system for purely electoral reasons, but they also realized significant electoral dividends from their efforts. The policy explanation for congressional reform, in contrast, asserts that policy dissatisfaction among liberal Democrats, unable to implement their policy agenda because of a committee system dominated by southern conservatives, provided the incentive for reform. Sinclair (1995, 29) In summary, not only did northern Democrats have ample incentive to reform the committee system for purely electoral reasons, but they also realized significant electoral dividends from their efforts. The policy explanation for congressional reform, in contrast, asserts that policy dissatisfaction among liberal Democrats, unable to implement their policy agenda because of a committee system dominated by southern conservatives, provided the incentive for reform. Sinclair (1995, 29) In summary, not only did northern Democrats have ample incentive to reform the committee system for purely electoral reasons, but they also realized significant electoral dividends from their efforts. The policy explanation for congressional reform, in contrast, asserts that policy dissatisfaction among liberal Democrats, unable to implement their policy agenda because of a committee system dominated by southern conservatives, provided the incentive for reform. Sinclair (1995, 29) In summary, not only did northern Democrats have ample incentive to reform the committee system for purely electoral reasons, but they also realized significant electoral dividends from their efforts. The policy explanation for congressional reform, in contrast, asserts that policy dissatisfaction among liberal Democrats, unable to implement their policy agenda because of a committee system dominated by southern conservatives, provided the incentive for reform. Sinclair (1995, 29) In summary, not only did northern Democrats have ample incentive to reform the committee system for purely electoral reasons, but they also realized significant electoral dividends from their efforts. The policy explanation for congressional reform, in contrast, asserts that policy dissatisfaction among liberal Democrats, unable to implement their policy agenda because of a committee system dominated by southern conservatives, provided the incentive for reform. Sinclair (1995, 29) describes the apparent policy frustration of northern liberals in the late 1960s as follows:
The mass of highly significant liberal legislation passed during the mid-1960s demonstrated that, under extraordinary circumstances, internal structural barriers to nonincremental policy change could be overcome. For a time, liberal dissatisfaction with the system lessened. However, in the late 1960s, in the aftermath of the overwhelming numbers they had commanded in the mid-1960s, and the replacement of a skillful progressive ally with the often hostile Nixon as president, liberals again perceived the committee system to be a significant barrier to the advancement of their goals. Naturally, there were elements of the liberal policy agenda that were not enacted between the end of the 89th Congress and the onset of congressional reform, and thus there most certainly was some dissatisfaction and frustration among liberals. Yet their policy successes in the prereform congresses, excluding the 89th, were impressive, and when one adds the extraordinary accomplishments of the 89th to the subsequent accomplishments of the 90th and 91 st, the extent of policy frustration among northern liberals is questionable. Naturally, there were elements of the liberal policy agenda that were not enacted between the end of the 89th Congress and the onset of congressional reform, and thus there most certainly was some dissatisfaction and frustration among liberals. Yet their policy successes in the prereform congresses, excluding the 89th, were impressive, and when one adds the extraordinary accomplishments of the 89th to the subsequent accomplishments of the 90th and 91 st, the extent of policy frustration among northern liberals is questionable. Naturally, there were elements of the liberal policy agenda that were not enacted between the end of the 89th Congress and the onset of congressional reform, and thus there most certainly was some dissatisfaction and frustration among liberals. Yet their policy successes in the prereform congresses, excluding the 89th, were impressive, and when one adds the extraordinary accomplishments of the 89th to the subsequent accomplishments of the 90th and 91 st, the extent of policy frustration among northern liberals is questionable. Naturally, there were elements of the liberal policy agenda that were not enacted between the end of the 89th Congress and the onset of congressional reform, and thus there most certainly was some dissatisfaction and frustration among liberals. Yet their policy successes in the prereform congresses, excluding the 89th, were impressive, and when one adds the extraordinary accomplishments of the 89th to the subsequent accomplishments of the 90th and 91 st, the extent of policy frustration among northern liberals is questionable. Naturally, there were elements of the liberal policy agenda that were not enacted between the end of the 89th Congress and the onset of congressional reform, and thus there most certainly was some dissatisfaction and frustration among liberals. Yet their policy successes in the prereform congresses, excluding the 89th, were impressive, and when one adds the extraordinary accomplishments of the 89th to the subsequent accomplishments of the 90th and 91 st, the extent of policy frustration among northern liberals is questionable. Naturally, there were elements of the liberal policy agenda that were not enacted between the end of the 89th Congress and the onset of congressional reform, and thus there most certainly was some dissatisfaction and frustration among liberals. Yet their policy successes in the prereform congresses, excluding the 89th, were impressive, and when one adds the extraordinary accomplishments of the 89th to the subsequent accomplishments of the 90th and 91 st, the extent of policy frustration among northern liberals is questionable. Naturally, there were elements of the liberal policy agenda that were not enacted between the end of the 89th Congress and the onset of congressional reform, and thus there most certainly was some dissatisfaction and frustration among liberals. Yet their policy successes in the prereform congresses, excluding the 89th, were impressive, and when one adds the extraordinary accomplishments of the 89th to the subsequent accomplishments of the 90th and 91 st, the extent of policy frustration among northern liberals is questionable.
Money and Partisan Politics in the Postreform
Money and Partisan Politics in the Postreform House
Although political action committees continued to provide a significant infusion of money into the campaign finance system throughout the 1980s, the costs of campaigning soon exceeded even what the PACs could provide. Real campaign costs continued to rise sharply. Total campaign spending in 1980 was 120% more than in 1976, even though the cost of living increased only 35% over the same four-year period. Costs were driven up by increased use of television and radio, by increased fundraising expenditures aimed at raising money under the contribution limits in small amounts, and by the
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In addition to the rapidly escalating cost of campaigning, two other factors strained the campaign finance system in the 1980s. First, the contribution limits that were established in 1974 were not indexed to inflation. A $1,000 contribution in 1974 had a real value of only about $400 in 1990. The second factor was what Sorauf (1992) has described as "softness" in the supply of money to congressional campaigns. The pool of money available for congressional campaigns, which comes entirely from individuals, stopped expanding. Beginning sometime in the early to mid-1980s, the number of individuals contributing money to political campaigns began to decline, and even though the size of the average contribution increased, the overall pool of money stopped growing. The costs of campaigning continued to rise sharply, however, so that candidates experienced considerable financial pressures in the 1980s, similar to those of the late 1960s, but within the context of a very different campaign finance system.
As pressures on the campaign finance system mounted throughout the 1980s, both political parties, but especially the Democrats, turned increasingly to soft money. Soft money was created by amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1979 and was intended to strengthen the role of parties in federal campaigns. Consequently, it is not subject to the usual contribution limits ofFECA, and prior to 1991, it did not have to be reported to the Federal Election Commission. State and local party committees are allowed to spend unlimited amounts of soft money on voter registration, get-out-the-vote activities, and campaign materials used for volunteer activities (e.g., lawn signs, bumper stickers, sample ballots, and so forth). Moreover, this money can be coordinated with candidates' campaigns if it is used for mobilization activities. For example, soft money can be used for TV promotion of a party's general philosophy or for specific legislative positions, but not for the promotion of specific candidates.
In 1980, the Republican National Committee allegedly raised $9 million of soft money in contributions of unspecified size from individuals and corporations ). This money was targeted and distributed to state party committees where it was used for votermobilization efforts, allowing the Reagan campaign to use its public funds for other purposes. Although the exact amount of the GOP's soft money expenditures in 1980 is a matter of some dispute , perceptions that the Republicans were raising significant amounts of soft money motivated the Democrats to do the same.
Soft money has been much more important for the Democratic than for the Republican national committees, which are much more professionalization of campaigns and the corresponding need to hire expensive consultants.
In 1980, the Republican National Committee allegedly raised $9 million of soft money in contributions of unspecified size from individuals and corporations . This money was targeted and distributed to state party committees where it was used for votermobilization efforts, allowing the Reagan campaign to use its public funds for other purposes. Although the exact amount of the GOP's soft money expenditures in 1980 is a matter of some dispute , perceptions that the Republicans were raising significant amounts of soft money motivated the Democrats to do the same.
Soft money has been much more important for the Democratic than for the Republican national committees, which are much more As the pressures to raise campaign funds escalated throughout the 1980s, competition between congressional Democrats and Republicans for business contributions intensified from what it had been a decade earlier. Both parties were pulled increasingly into the political orbit of business, despite the fact that organized labor continued to contribute primarily to Democrats. One consequence of the bipartisan pursuit of business money has been a blurring of the basic distinction between Republicans as the party of business and Democrats as the party of organized labor. The aggressive pursuit of business money by both national parties makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the parties to take distinct policy positions on issues of general concern to the business community. Indeed, David Austen-Smith (1987) has demonstrated theoretically that when two competitive parties solicit campaign contributions in order to maximize their vote shares, both parties will move their policy platforms in the same direction, toward the interests of the largest contributor.
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The extent to which the Democratic congressional policy agenda actually gravitated toward business throughout the 1980s is an empirical matter that deserves closer investigation than can be provided here. We do know, however, that the operative preferences of Democratic House members have changed to a more pro-business orientation over the very period of time that the party has needed to co-opt the financial support of business. Rohde 
Conclusions
Several conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing discussion. First, American congressional parties may appear more partisan at some times than others, but fundamentally they are reelection machines. While party leaders may at times attempt to focus on and accentuate the party's legislative record, the purpose in doing so is to attract the sponsorship of important interest groups needed to reelect the party's rank-and-file. Second, contrary to Schattschneider's assertion, cohesive legislative parties will not necessarily "shut out" interest groups. The case of the Democrats indicates that increases in party cohesion may actually correspond with efforts by the party to accommodate the preferences of important interest groups. Whereas the dominant organized interest in the 1950s and 1960s was labor, the dominant interest since the 1970s has been business. If the influence of organized labor has diminished, it is not because parties in Congress are more cohesive, but because congressional organizations and procedures have been adjusted to accommodate business's political interests in order to raise money. Thus, the balance of power has shifted, but it has shifted among interest groups, not away from interest groups.
Finally, the distinction between American parties and their "responsible" European counterparts is somewhat overdrawn in terms of how they interact with interest groups. Legislative parties in both types of systems must forge coalitions among organized interests, and thus, group influence can be substantial even in cohesive party systems. As Epstein (1982, 292) observes, a parliamentary party "may enact policies as a party in the way that an American party cannot regularly manage, but the policies may be the product of particularized interest groups rather than of any programmatic commitments backed by majority support." Thus, the key differences between the two systems are that (1) in parliamentary systems, interest-group lobbying is less visible because important interests are frequently incorporated into the formal policymaking structure, and (2) in parliamentary systems, groups need to influence only the majority party. Consequently, one does not observe cross-party lobbying in strong party systems, but in the United States, the tendency of corporate and trade PACs to contribute substantially to members of both parties suggests that a good deal of cross-party lobbying occurs.
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6. This figure is based on a total of $173 million dollars of soft-money contributions that the Center for Responsive Politics was able to identify by donor interest.
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